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AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

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IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (18 Jun 70) FOR OT UT 701206

22 June 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 4th Transportation Command, Period Ending 31 January 1970

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 4th Transportation Command (Tml C)
APO San Francisco 96243

AVCA SGN TC GCPT

10 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 4th Transportation Command for Period Ending
31 January 1970 RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

THRU: Commanding Officer
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TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development (ACSFOR)
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Section 1. Significant Activities:

a. On 12 November 1969 Colonel A. J. Silvestri assumed command from Colonel John E. Murray. (See Incl 1).

b. Due to the constantly changing logistical situation, the 4th Transportation Command has reorganized. On 7 January 1970, the 11th Transportation Battalion's assets were transferred to the 159th Transportation Battalion whose colors were relocated to Cat Lai. (See Incl 5-7). This change reflected the phase down of operations at Vung Tau.

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c. On 31 January 1970, the US Army Transportation Battalion Saigon (Provisional) was discontinued and its companies attached to the 71st Transportation Battalion. See Incl 8-12. As reflected in the organizational chart (See Incl 4), the 4th Transportation Command is now composed of two super battalions and Camp Davies.

d. Vung Tau Port is phasing out, but has really proved its worth this period. During the previous quarter, tonnage decreased steadily from 79,000 S/T in August to 34,000 S/T in October. However, this period the tonnage has sharply climbed from the October low of 34,000 S/T to 53,000 S/T for January. This is significant when it is noted that Vung Tau is primarily used as a safety valve for cargo in excess of Newport's capability.

e. New 24 hour tonnage records were set at Newport, Saigon and Cat Lai this period. A port record was set at Newport on 4 January when 8,964 short tons or 19,256 measurement tons were discharged from four (4) deep draft vessels, a RO/RO and two (2) LST's. The record was set at MML, Saigon Port on 22 January when 5,241 short tons of cement was discharged from the USNS Brostrom, eclipsing the previous record established in October 1969 by 369 short tons. The Cat Lai "ammo humpers" also got into the act by discharging 3,583 short tons of ammunition from Green Cove, American Forwarder and Garden State, surpassing their November 1969 record by 448 short tons.

f. There was a sharp decrease in the number of reefer vessels received in the III and IV Corps tactical zones, RVN, during this past quarter. Three vessels were received in November for a total tonnage of 6,570 short tons; one in December with 1,934 short tons and two in January with a total of 2,644 short tons. Total reefer tonnage discharged was 11,154 short tons as compared with 19,266 for the previous quarter. However, of note was the increase in the average 24 hour discharge rate from the FY 69 rate of 160 short tons to a new high of 460 short tons. This was accomplished through the introduction of management techniques and cooperation between discharging port and receiving depot.

g. Cargo clearance at Newport took on a new look when on 5 Dec 69 a Chinook helicopter descended and removed three 80' poles for the 1st Infantry Division.

h. A sympathy strike by contract stevedores in conjunction with a bus drivers union occurred in the 4th Transportation Command on the morning of 7 Jan 70 and lasted 24 hours. No vessels were working in Saigon, however, Newport and Cat Lai were both filled to capacity. U.S. military stevedore gangs were organized and did an outstanding job at both ports.

i. Since its inception late in October, Operation CANTEX has continued to provide scheduled river convoy support of Delta sub-ports at Binh Thuy and Vinh Long. As the backbone of the water transshipment support of the Delta by the 4th Transportation Command, CANTEX has proved to be a most effective operation. The published monthly schedules allow consignors and consignees to know when to submit

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paper work for booking and the precise time when cargo will be received from any one shipment. The success of CANTEX is underscored by its enviable record of prompt arrivals and departures to the satisfaction of all parties concerned.

j. Because of the heavy increase in POL requirements, this Command's participation in POL resupply of the Delta jumped significantly during the reporting period. Utilizing 10,000 gallon rubber inserts, two (2) LCM-8's from the 1099th Trans Co (Med Bt) were dedicated to POL resupply of smaller Delta sub-ports. The bladders are pumped full at Nha Be and then discharged in the same manner at destination. These "bladder boats" play an increasingly important role in servicing sub-ports such as Moc Hoa and Rach Soi which cannot be reached by Y-tanker because of various restrictions such as low bridge clearance and narrow or shallow channel passages.

k. The port facility at Ben Keo operated by this command in support of Tay Ninh is being moved. Plagued by barely adequate pier space, by limited staging area and by conflicting mission requirements at such a small site, operations at Ben Keo are being de-emphasized in favor of the new barge and LCU/LCM site at Phu Ninh scheduled to open 15 February 1970.

l. Separation of RGU (Newport) from RGL. During the reporting period the separation of Saigon and Newport became a reality. Cargo in CONUS is now being booked and loaded onto RVN bound vessels with USAID and MASF cargo going to RGL (Saigon) and US military and US military affiliated cargo going to RGU (Newport). However, the cargo was not always loaded for a dual port discharge with cargo for both ports loaded together in the same hatch. The emphasis was placed on keeping Newport full, so all vessels regardless of cargo were berthed at Newport with the Saigon berths used for the overflow. Decisions were made at higher headquarters to discharge US military cargo at Newport and only USAID and MASF cargo at Saigon. Saigon Transportation Terminal Command (ARVN) is assuming responsibility for the discharge of MASF cargo and 4th TC is discharging USAID cargo in Saigon.

m. Command emphasis was placed on reducing the amount of contract barges utilized by this command.

(1) In June 1969 the barge fleet totaled 141 pieces of floating equipment. A reduction of twenty five (25) local contract barges was effected by not renewing the existing contracts on 1 July 1969. The Luzon contract totaled 41 barges and the Army-owned barges totaled 75. In December, an evaluation was made of the remaining contract barges to determine how many of these could be released. It was determined that a total of thirty (30) barges could be taken off hire. These were broken down as follows:

(a) Four (4) contract barges which had been used for dunnage were replaced with four (4) old APB artillery barges converted for dunnage use.

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(b) Twenty six (26) ammo barges used in the Cat Lai system. The same amount of ammo is transported but more efficient use of the remaining assets by faster turnaround time and other timesaving applications that were initiated, affect this reduction.

(2) At the present time a total of eighty-six (86) barges remain under control of the 4th Transportation Command in the Ammunition and General Cargo System. This is augmented by 13 ARVN contract barges used for ARVN ammo.

n. Turnaround Time: During this reporting period, 4th Transportation Command ports experienced the following turnaround for deep draft vessels:

(1) Newport Army Terminal:

- (a) 121 ships worked.
- (b) 2.4 average number of days working.
- (c) 0.1 average number of days waiting.

(2) Saigon Army Terminal:

- (a) 36 ships worked.
- (b) 2.0 average number of days working.
- (c) 0.2 average number of days waiting.

(3) Cat Lai Army Terminal:

- (a) 31 ships worked.
- (b) 8.9 average number of days working.
- (c) 2.3 average number of days waiting.
- (d) 2.6 average number of days in hold.

(4) Vung Tau Army Terminal:

- (a) 25 ships worked.
- (b) 2.1 average number of days working.
- (c) 0.0 average number of days waiting.

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o. Both LST ramps at Newport required repairs during the quarter. The two ramps became structurally weakened after three years of continued use and had to undergo extensive repair. LST Slip #2 has been completed while LST Slip #1 is 95% completed.

p. Average monthly plaster expenditures were down approximately \$40,000 from last quarter due to a decrease in contract stevedore expenditures, specifically, the decrease is attributed to a decline in forklift rental because of better management and decline in tonnage.

q. Average cost per revenue ton at Saigon this quarter was \$2.65 compared to last quarter's average of \$3.11. The decrease is attributed to lower FY 70 contract stevedore rates and decreased tonnage.

r. Status of Funds - Contract Stevedores: The 4th TC has committed only 32.5% of the funds available for contract stevedores or 17.5% less than what could have been committed for the first half of FY 70. It is estimated that this will result in an excess of over \$3,000,000 in FY 70 stevedore contracts for Saigon Port. This excess is attributed to the reduced scope of work at Saigon.

s. Advancements in the automated Cargo Management System: During the period of November 1969 through January 1970, considerable progress was made with regard to improvements to and expansion of the automated Cargo Management System being implemented in the command.

(1) Improvements in the content and use of documents.

(a) Vessel Discharge Tallies: A computer generated special discharge tally for ammunition and explosives was introduced. The tally includes blocks for checking each ammo lot number and contains an extended nomenclature based on the DODIC Master file recently incorporated in the Cargo Management System. These changes enable checker personnel to tally cargo by detailed commodity and TCN and has improved the outturn reporting for ammunition vessels.

(b) Hatch Summary: The computer generated Hatch Summary was revised to furnish more detailed information for pre-planning purposes and to identify with in-the-clear remarks, and protected or classified shipments which require inspection prior to discharging of the vessel.

(c) Outturn Discrepancy Worksheet: Additional computer program decisions were incorporated into the Outturn Discrepancy Worksheet to eliminate overages or shortages caused by the last three characters of the TCN being unequal.

(2) New Reports added to the systems:

(a) Vessel Forecast: A weekly Vessel Forecast Report was developed during the reporting period. The report reflects vessels due to arrive, tonnage manifested

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and a general cargo breakout. The report is in estimated date of arrival sequence with totals by fifteen days and discharging port.

(b) Consignee Tonnage Report: A monthly tonnage report by consignee is now being prepared for management purposes. The report is prepared by service and consignee and reflects tonnage and percentage of cargo handled for each consignee.

(c) Outstanding TCID Follow-up Report: A report of shipments that cleared the port and were not receipted for by the consignee is being prepared monthly. The report lists all TCIDs that are outstanding over 20 days and reflects complete detailed descriptions of the shipments to aid the consignee in identifying receipt of the cargo.

(d) Hatch Recap: A summary of cargo by hatch, service and general commodity is now being prepared for each vessel. The recap identifies special handling cargo and is used to aid the terminals in preplanning the discharge operations.

(3) Automation Expansion: During the reporting period, a new procedure was established for offering and booking retrograde cargo. This procedure provides the automated system with a copy of the TCID when cargo is offered for movement, when cargo arrives at the terminal, and when cargo is booked for a vessel. Entering this information into the computer enables the Cargo Accounting Division to edit data in advance of cargo arrival at the port, establish a due-in report, prepare the shipside manifest by computer and maintain an accurate in-port inventory of retrograde cargo, as well as, providing a weekly retrograde shipment report to higher headquarters.

t. A total of 159 TCID's were received for tracer investigation during the period 1 November 1969 to 25 January 1970. These are TCID's on which the consignee has denied receipt of cargo. Of this total 123 have been investigated. Investigation revealed that the cargo covered by 121 of these TCID's was received by consignees, returned to port for further shipment or was diverted to another authorized consignee without change to the TCID. Inadequate records management on the part of the carrier has resulted in two TCID's out of the total investigated to be carried in a questionable status. Although there is no conclusive evidence that the cargo was received by consignee, investigation has reasonably established that the shipment actually arrived. In most cases the same problem as has existed previously continues with consignees failing to sign the No 2 copy of the TCID and return it promptly to Cargo Accounting Division for proper reconciliation.

u. Reported cargo pilferage dropped from the previous reporting period by approximately \$700. This quarter showed a total reported pilferage of \$3,387 while recoveries reported total \$4,001. The total value lost through pilferage may

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appear high in actual dollars and cents, however in comparison to the millions of dollars of cargo actually handled in the ports of this command, the amount is minor. The decrease in amount of pilferage can be attributed to tighter controls imposed on handling of security cargo, improved documentation and closer supervision over the security warehouses. Also, the phase down of operations in USAT Saigon has aided in reducing pilferage.

v. This quarter was the lowest of the year for reported offenses, crimes and traffic violations. There was a total of 224 various reports received. The month of December 1969 was a record month for reported offenses. A total of 53 reports were received which was the lowest month for a two-year period. Multiple offenders have been identified and a roster prepared for use by commanders in pin-pointing and eliminating habitual offenders from the service.

w. A meeting was held during the reporting period between members of the 4th Transportation Command and the ARVN Saigon Transportation Terminal Command (STTC). The meeting was called to delineate the role of STTC in assuming responsibility for security of M&M dock areas. STTC will provide security at Gates 2, 3 and 4 jointly with US Military Police until such time as ARVN is capable of assuming full responsibility for these gates. ARVN security personnel will check all ARVN vehicles and ARVN civilian contract vehicles for proper load and documentation. Vietnamese control documents will be used for ARVN cargo and will not be checked by US military policemen. The US military police will remain on Gates 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the M&M area to check US cargo vehicles and TCMD's exiting the M&M area. The ARVN STTC assumed the responsibility of providing outboard ship guards, pier guards, warehouse guards, and security of the three M&M berths and associated area as required. The present pass exchange system will remain in effect using the prepared daily hire passes. Close liaison will be maintained between the security officers of the 4th Trans Comd and STTC. US military policemen will continue to provide escort for US security cargo leaving the Saigon Port area.

x. On 15 November 1969, the 305th Heavy Boat Group (ARVN) commanded by CPT Thanh, began unit training with the 5th Heavy Boat Company at Vung Tau. To accomplish this on-the-job training program, twelve man crews (full ARVN TOE crew) were placed aboard ten different LCU's. Five US personnel (master, boatswain, chief engineer, assistant engineer, and cook) remained on each LCU to provide technical advice and assistance and protect US interest. The total number of ARVN trainees involved in the unit training is 133.

y. On 25 November 1969, one ARVN NCO received a Certificate of Achievement for satisfactory completion of on-the-job training in Ship Planning at Newport.

z. On 28 January 1969, two ARVN officers received Certificates of Completion for their on-the-job training at HQ, 4th Trans Comd. CPT Phuong received instructions in Port and Terminal Operations, and trained with Operations Branch, ACofS, G3 for six months. CPT Ren trained with the HQ Harbormaster for three

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months and the US Army Transportation Battalion, Saigon for the remaining three months. The certificates were presented by the Hon Barry Shillito, Assistant Secretary of Defense (I&L).

aa. Additional on-the-job training was begun in the marine maintenance field on 30 January 1970 at HIAV Det #4, Saigon. Four ARVN enlisted men are to receive training in engine repair, machinery and quality control procedures. This program is scheduled for 90 days.

bb. Project SWITCH: During the period 1 Nov 69 - 31 Jan 70 this command contributed to the "ARVN Modernization and Improvement Program" by participating in Project SWITCH 1097. Upon redeployment of the 9th Infantry Division from Vietnam, the assets of the 1097th Trans Co (Med Bt) were left in-country. Augmented by 27 boats, the 544th Trans Co (Med Bt) assumed the additional mission of preparing the TOE equipment of the 1097th Trans Co for subsequent transfer to the ARVN. Utilizing a two-phased operational concept, the 544th SWITCHED 14 and 13 boats respectively. TOE equipment and craft were transferred during Phase II as opposed to only vessels during Phase I. The major problem was caused by the poor maintenance condition of these boats. These craft were idle for a minimum of 90 days without assigned crews, which resulted in the rapid deterioration of this equipment.

cc. CIMI's: During the reporting period seven units of 4th TC were inspected by 1st LC CIMI Team. Two units were rated unsatisfactory and five attained satisfactory ratings. However, upon reinspection these two units were found to be satisfactory. The primary causes of the unsatisfactory ratings were the deficiencies found in maintenance management operations. This headquarters continued to conduct pre-CIMI's and assistance visits designed to inspect and instruct subordinate units in an effort to raise maintenance standards.

dd. Roadside Spot Check Inspections: The roadside spot check and on-site inspection of wheeled vehicles and MHE of the command was continued and intensified during the quarter. Satisfactory ratings were attained in most instances during the first two months of the reporting period. During the last month a slight decrease in maintenance standards was detected, which was overcome by frequent instructional visits.

ee. Equipment deadlines rates: MHE deadline rates remained steady during the reporting period. Initial non-availability rates of 8% dipped to a low of 6% in mid-December and rose to a high of 13% in mid-January. The MHE deadline rate of the command averaged 8.5% at the end of the reporting period, well below the USARV tolerance rate.

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2. Section 2: Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

- a. Personnel: None
- b. Intelligence: None
- c. Operations:

(1) ITEM: Vessel Delays - Anchor Problems:

(a) OBSERVATION: The Seatrain Maryland and the Overseas Suzanne both encountered anchor-windlass problems while on berth. The Seatrain Maryland was delayed three days after completion of discharge and backload whereas the problem with the Overseas Suzanne became apparent as it was getting ready to shift to Newport from Saigon to discharge US military cargo. Fortunately, permission was received to discharge the US military cargo at Saigon, so delay and berth tie-up was averted. This type of situation can be expected to be faced in the future.

(b) EVALUATION: This situation presents problems for Newport because of the tight schedules for vessels coming up river.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Since sufficient power is maintained on board each vessel, recommend that 12-18 hours prior to sail time, the anchor windlass be tested to insure proper working order.

(2) ITEM: Terminal Service Billing:

(a) OBSERVATION: An intensive study was done by the 4th Trans Comd in the area of reimbursable terminal services. It was discovered that billing procedures were unclear as definite guidance from higher headquarters is not available in this area, especially in regard to billing of MSTS or MSTS chartered vessels.

(b) EVALUATION: 4th TC, with the cooperation of MSTS, has updated terminal service procedures for battalions to use in their determination of reimbursable services; the 4th TC Terminal Tariff was updated, and a fact sheet on reimbursable terminal services was presented to battalion commanders. Records were established at this headquarters to insure that current billing is complete, and a series of correspondence between 4th TC and USARPAC CFMA was completed insuring 4th TC that past billing is also up-to-date. Correspondence to higher headquarters on this subject is forthcoming.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: 1. Terminal commanders take an active interest in terminal service billing to insure that documentation for reimbursable terminal service is completed and forwarded to higher headquarters to get reimbursement for the US Army.

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2. That higher headquarters review the area of terminal services provided by the US Army and publish definitive guidance for subordinate commands.

(3) ITEM: Vessel Diversions:

(a) OBSERVATION: With the expansion of the Vietnamization program, numerous vessels are being diverted from the manifested port to a different discharging port.

(b) EVALUATION: The Cargo Management System was designed to control vessels by discharging port using a local assigned number for each vessel and POD. All documents input into the system contain this number until the vessel documentation is complete. Considerable difficulty was encountered whenever a vessel was diverted. The data that was recorded on the master files had to be deleted and re-entered for the new POD, under a new vessel number. This process required 48 hours; or two computer cycles to complete. In order to handle diversions a special computer transaction was developed that enables the vessel number and POD for all computer records to be changed during one cycle.

(4) ITEM: Export manifesting of SEAVAN containers.

(a) OBSERVATION: MSTs pays SEAVAN carriers based on contents of vans as reflected in the T-M entries appearing on the cargo manifest.

(b) EVALUATION: With the expansion of the Cargo Management System to include manifesting SEAVANs, it was discovered that TXM entries describing the cargo loaded in the vans were sometimes not appearing on the final manifest. MSTs was refusing to pay the carrier if the TXM entries did not balance to the pieces, weight and cube appearing in the TXK; container prime entry, which is not the case with other consolidated shipments. Computer program modifications were required to edit the TXM entries and insure that the total pieces, weight and cube equaled the pieces, weight and cube appearing in the TXK prior to preparation of the final manifest. This is accomplished by subtracting each TXM entry from the TXK until the last TXM entry has been processed. If the TXK entry does not reduce to zero for the container a message is printed reflecting the difference and the item is not manifested until the container pieces, weight, and cube are corrected.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a similar system as described above be incorporated in other computer systems for manifesting SEAVANs in order that proper payment of SEAVAN carriers can be accomplished.

(5) ITEM: Voyage Reference Code assignment and control.

(a) OBSERVATION: Voyage Reference Codes are not being assigned correctly.

(b) EVALUATION: DOD Reg 4500.32R (MILSTAMP) defines Voyage Reference Code as a code to be used in preparing automated cargo manifests to insure that the Voyage

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2. That future computer systems for transportation documentation include a transceiver as part of the required system.

(7) ITEM: Overseas Terminal Automation of Ocean Documentation

(a) OBSERVATION: Ocean manifest data can be timely between inter and intra theater ports only if all terminals have automated procedures.

(b) EVALUATION: MILSTAMP procedures are designed for use under both automated and manual processing; however, they are not effective if ports under manual procedures are within 3 to 5 days sailing of each other. Advanced documentation cannot be air mailed fast enough to meet the preplanning requirements of the POD if the vessel sailing time does not exceed ten days. An example of this is the non-receipt of advanced information on vessels sailing from Thailand and Taiwan to Saigon. These two ports are the only major shipping points in the Pacific that do not have automated procedures though computer systems are available. The reason for not automating terminal documentation is the lack of experienced MILSTAMP-ADP personnel assigned to the overseas terminals. During the reporting period experienced ADP personnel from this command visited Thailand for the sole purpose of providing assistance in the development of automated procedures for the terminals at Sattahip and Vayama. Based on this visit computer programming is now underway and Thailand should be able to receive and transmit cargo manifest data by the end of February 70.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: 1. That consideration be given to assigning trained MILSTAMP-ADP personnel to every terminal command that is deployed overseas.

2. That standardized automated procedures be developed that can be utilized on available computer systems allowing the overseas terminals to process MILSTAMP data from the inception of the overseas operation.

(8) ITEM: Multiple Port Calls for Vessels Bound for RGL/RGU.

(a) OBSERVATION: The recent decision to discharge USAID/MAP cargo only at Saigon and US military cargo only at Newport has required the shifting of vessels carrying both types of cargo from Saigon to Newport and vice versa. Vessels are being loaded in CONUS for port calls at both ports, but not in any particular order. The bulk of cargo backloaded is retrograde and, due to its proximity to collection points, Newport is the only suitable terminal to load retrograde. Vessels loaded to call at Newport first and Saigon second, must make a second shift back to Newport after discharging at Saigon if cleared to load retrograde cargo. Unfortunately, the constant fluidity of the surface shipping situation makes it impossible for vessels to be programmed for Vietnam backload while on berth at CONUS terminals.

(b) EVALUATION: Due to the critical berth situation at Newport, it is not always possible to schedule the shift back to Newport after a Saigon discharge. A delay on berth at Saigon ties up that particular berth leaving it unavailable for another vessel.

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Header Cards are in form of manifest detail cards pertaining to a specific part of a cargo manifest. The Voyage Reference Code is used as a control for expanding the manifest detail records to include POB, first position of Voyage Document Number and date sailed, which can only be obtained from the Voyage Header Card. CONUS manifesting activities are sometimes inserting the same Voyage Reference Code in different Voyage Header and detail cards, causing erroneous data to be manifested at the discharging terminal. Example: A transceived manifest was received from Eastern Area MIMTS that had three loading ports (IIA, IE6, IGC). IIA and IGC both had the same Voyage Reference Code in the Voyage Header and detail cards causing all items to be input into the computer traffic message tonnage to the manifested tonnage and added programming effort had to be expended to correct the documentation. A message was sent to Eastern Area MIMTS explaining the problem and requesting that future transceived manifests include correct Voyage Reference Codes.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That MILSTAMP be followed in the assignment of Voyage Reference Codes in all punched card cargo manifests.

(6) ITEM: Transceiver Facility for ADP Terminal Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: Little consideration is given to the need of an in-house transceiver capability for processing cargo manifest data by computer.

(b) EVALUATION: The automated Cargo Management System was designed to receive, process and dispatch cargo data in accordance with MILSTAMP. A primary objective of MILSTAMP is on-time delivery of material through the use of a uniform cargo movement system, incorporating the optimum use of data processing systems and high speed data transmission. This command has been provided five of the six essential elements to accomplish the objectives of MILSTAMP. There is input data to be processed, personnel to manipulate the data, a computer system to process the data, personnel resources to operate the equipment and the resultant output. The element missing is an internal communications media, which would give the command the ability to receive and dispatch cargo data on a timely basis. At present this command obtains its transceiver service from MACV Data Management Agency (DMA) at Tan Son Nhut which is located approximately 10 miles from the computer site, requiring daily courier service, resulting in additional time required for receipt and dispatch of manifest data. Cards are sometimes lost, or damaged while intransit between the communications site and the computer site. In-country sailings are only 24 to 48 hours and advanced documentation cannot be furnished unless a transceiver is available at the site. A request for a transceiver at the computer site was not favorably considered because of the lack of volume (approximately 150,000 cards per month).

(c) RECOMMENDATION: 1. That guidelines for the approval of a transceiver facility consider the requirement for timely receipt and dispatch of data instead of the volume handled.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION: That vessels calling at both Saigon and Newport be loaded to call at Saigon first and then Newport, so that any vessel cleared to backload can be loaded immediately upon completion of discharge with no delays incurred due to nonavailability of pier space.

(9) ITEM The difficulty of effectively monitoring commercial trucks through Newport Army Terminal.

(a) OBSERVATION: It is the policy of the CO, 4th Transportation Command that commercial vehicle time-in-terminal should never exceed two hours. Several different techniques were attempted at Newport to ensure this but none proved successful until the present system was set up. The new system has its headquarters in the Newport Transportation Section building. An NCO records all commercial vehicles by number on a large board as they enter the terminal and then assigns them to a load site. He has continual radio contact with each load site and with his roving jeep. If the commercial vehicle does not arrive at the load site within a reasonable length of time (five minutes) then the roving jeep is called and searches for the offender. This radio contact is maintained with the documentation personnel in the TCID shack and with the gate so that the vehicle is monitored throughout the entire terminal.

(b) EVALUATION: In order to meet the commander's goals, it was necessary to set up a radio monitoring system for commercial vehicles at the Newport Army Terminal. After much experimentation, we learned that this system is the best available and it has proven to be very successful. We have very effectively cut down on the time-in-terminal and are presently perfecting the system to the degree that we should be able to approach the commander's guidelines within a month.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the radio monitoring system presently in effect be continued since it has been proven by much trial and error that this is the best system available for monitoring commercial vehicles within Newport Army Terminal.

(10) ITEM: Watercraft Assets and Delta Requirements:

(a) OBSERVATION: During the past six months a constant 4 or 5 of this command's LCU assets have been tied up in shipyard for annual overhaul. Specifically, this has meant ten (10) or eleven (11) out of the twenty-seven (27) LCUs assigned have been unavailable for commitment for a six month period. With the recent redeployment of units from the Delta and the still high activity of units still in that area, requirements for transshipment have continued to increase. Operation CANTEX, while being a most useful operational system has not increased our physical resupply capability.

(b) EVALUATION: Because of the shortage of water assets, port operation barges have been required to augment the LCU/LCM assets of this command by making line hauls which would normally be accomplished on self-propelled lighterage, particularly to Ben Keo (Tay Ninh) where a virtually stationary barge is a most appealing target for the enemy.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION: That additional LCU assets be made available for LCU transshipment.

d. Organization: None

e. Training: None

f. Logistics:

(1) ITEM: Baker Forklift, 4000 lb Electrical

(a) OBSERVATION: The 124th Transportation Company received thirty (30) new electric forklifts during the reporting period. Deprocessing was accomplished by the unit and the forklifts were placed into operation. Upon removal of the inspection plate, the electrical components were found to be corroded and full of rust deposits, to include contact points and other metal surfaces. It was determined that the corrosion, rust, and moisture found on the electrical panel were the primary causes of the equipment failures.

(b) EVALUATION: Representatives from the Mobility Equipment Command were consulted and an Equipment Improvement Recommendation was submitted. The need for climatizing the equipment during deprocessing was evident. Procedures were established to clean all corroded metal surfaces and contact points using Compound, cleaner, FSN 6910-655-0399 and Spray, anti-corrosion, FSN 8030-933-1947. The inspection plate allowed moisture to enter the electrical compartment. To correct this situation gaskets were installed to make a watertight seal.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: It is recommended that: 1. The electrical component panel of this model forklift be climatized by USAIECQJ prior to shipment to Vietnam.

2. Deprocessing instructions published by DA be amended, to contain procedures for climatizing the equipment.

(2) ITEM: Turn-in of Equipment of Deactivating Units.

(a) OBSERVATION: Due to the short time frames between notification, standdown and deactivation, the process of identifying, reporting and physically turning in equipment, proved difficult.

(b) EVALUATION: Based upon guidance provided by higher headquarters, coordination was made with maintenance support and transportation units for repair and necessary truck support. Hand receipts were cleared and installation property required by replacement units was transferred.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that:

1. USARV provide earlier notification of stand-down and deactivation dates.

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2 Units operating staging areas be granted personnel augmentation to preclude the levying of deactivating units which are in most cases already experiencing personnel shortages.

g. Communications: None

h. Material: None

i. Other:

(1) ITEM: Multiple Offender Personnel:

(a) OBSERVATION: During this quarter it was noted that a significant number of personnel in the 4th TC had numerous Article 15's with no administrative action having been taken against them. One reason for this is that personnel signing into a unit do not carry their personnel records with them. A commander frequently does not know how many Article 15's a man has received other than the one he himself administers. This is the case even if the individual comes from another 4th TC unit. As a result, certain multiple offenders have been permitted to DEROS with no thought having been given to administrative elimination or even a bar to re-enlistment.

(b) EVALUATION: In order to facilitate the identification of multiple offenders, this command reviewed all Article 15's and courts-martial imposed in this command in the last ten months. Those whose name appeared more than once or who had a combination of Article 15's and a court-martial were compiled on a list. This list was disseminated to commanders and will be updated as new multiple offenders are identified. Each commander concerned then makes a thorough evaluation of the individual's record of service and determines whether he has any usefulness to the Army. In a great number of cases bars to re-enlistment and even administrative elimination UP AR 636-212 are indicated, particularly for individuals with four or five Article 15's.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The principal benefits to the service to be derived from such a program are identification, rehabilitation, and elimination where necessary. These benefits can best be obtained by continual observation by commanders to include the individuals entire tour in Vietnam.

(2) ITEM: Church Attendance:

(a) OBSERVATION: The increase in attendance for this quarter was the direct result of extra services held during Christmas and Thanksgiving. The downward trend in counseling and interviews indicates morale improvements. Getting National television coverage for Christmas Eve Mass is a direct result of vision and prior planning by the 4th TC Catholic Chaplain.


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(b) EVALUATION: The result of these activities is an improvement of morale and conduct.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that emphasis continue to be placed upon chapel attendance and the Chaplain be utilized as counselor in personal problem solving. Further, it is recommended that TV and Radio coverage be procured when appropriate.


A. J. SILVESTRI
Colonel, TC
Commanding

12 Incl

- ~~1 - 4TC 00 42~~
- ~~2 - Command Personnel Listings~~
- ~~3 - Visitors Roster~~
- 4 - Organizational Chart
- ~~5 - 4TC 00 1~~
- ~~6 - 4TC 00 2~~
- ~~7 - 4TC 00 3~~
- ~~8 - 4TC 00 4~~
- ~~9 - 4TC 00 5~~
- ~~10 - 4TC 00 6~~
- ~~11 - 4TC 00 7~~
- ~~12 - 4TC 00 8~~

Incl 1 - 3 and 5 - 12 wd HQ, DA

AVCA GO 5 (10 Feb 70) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 4th Transportation Command (TAL C), Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

TO: US Army Support Command, Saigon, APO 96491 6 MAR 1970

FROM: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA GO-MH, APO 96384

1. Reference paragraph 2c(1), page 11. CONCUR. The 4th Transportation Command has discussed with MSTS the need for testing the anchor-windlass 12-18 hours prior to sailings to prevent departure delays. A letter is being prepared by this Headquarters to MSTS recommending that anchor windlasses be tested 12-18 hours prior to sail time to insure proper working order and provide time for necessary repairs.
2. Reference paragraph 2c(6), page 13. NONCONCUR. The need for a transceiver capability between Tan Son Nhut and Newport computer facilities has been reviewed by USARV signal elements and denied, based on expense and volume. The study gave consideration to the need for timely information.
3. Reference paragraph 2c(7), page 14. CONCUR. The request to standardize the MILSTAMP procedures at all participating ports is quite sound and should be followed up by applicable headquarters. It may be an appropriate topic at the monthly AMP Watch Committee meeting held at 1st Logistical Command.
4. Reference paragraph 2c(8), page 14. CONCUR. This headquarters is preparing a letter to MSTS recommending that vessels scheduled for both Saigon and Newport be loaded to call at Saigon first and then Newport to prevent unnecessary shifting for backload.
5. Reference paragraph 2c(10), page 15. CONCUR. The questions of mission assignment and ARVN participation are being studied at this and higher headquarters. Determination of the assets needed for Delta requirements will be based on the answers to these questions.
6. Reference paragraph 2f(2), page 16. NONCONCUR. Although there is a degree of personnel turbulence in a deactivating unit, the number of personnel levied against the unit to assist in processing its equipment for turn-in is not significant enough to compromise its mission or to require personnel augmentation to units operating staging areas.

AVCA SON GO S (10 Feb 70) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 4th Transportation Command (Tml C), Period Ending 31 January 1970, RGS CSFOR-65 (R2)

7. Lessons Learned, observations, and recommendations are concurred in by this command with the above exceptions.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LBN 2604

~~Michael D. Huston~~
MICHAEL D. HUSTON

CPT AGC

ASST AG

Cp:
4th Trans Cnd

AVCA GO-MH (10 Feb 70) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 4th Transportation
Command for period ending 31 January 1970 RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)(U)

DA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384 26 MAR 1970

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST,
APO 96375

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, 4th
Transportation Command for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 is forwarded.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning multiple port calls for vessels bound for
RG1/RGU, page 14, paragraph c(8). Concur. Message requesting action has been
forwarded to USARV for assistance.

b. Reference item concerning Baker Forklift, page 16, paragraph f(1).
Concur. Action has been taken through USAMECOM to provide improved climatization
of equipment during manufacture and processing for SEA shipment. This should,
in turn, alleviate the problem during deprocessing upon arrival and eliminate the
in-country requirement for climatizing this item of equipment.

c. Reference item concerning turn-in of equipment of inactivating units,
page 16, paragraph f(2). Nonconcur. Concur with comment 6, 1st Ind. Standdown
and inactivation dates are based upon Presidential announcement and are relayed
as soon as received. Earlier notification is not possible.

d. Reference item concerning multiple offender personnel, page 17, paragraph
i(1). Concur. Regulations preclude multiple offenders from carrying their
records upon reassignment as this would give them the opportunity to screen and
destroy derogatory actions in the MPRJ. The actions taken to insure the
identification of multiple offenders with subsequent rehabilitation or elimination
actions are deemed very beneficial and should be continued.

3. Concur with the basic report as modified by this and previous indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LBN 4862


M. E. CLARK
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

CF:
USASUPCOM, SGN
4th Trans Comd

AVHGC-DST (10 Feb 70) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 4th Transportation Command for Period
Ending 31 January 1970 RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 6 APR 1970

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN:GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 from Headquarters, 4th Transportation Command and concurs with the comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Export Manifest of SEAVAN Containers", page 12, paragraph 2c(4): concur. A computer program of the type described should be incorporated into any automated systems with the Department of Defense which manifest SEAVAN.

b. Reference item concerning "Overseas Terminal Automation of Ocean Documentation", page 14, paragraph 2(7)(c): concur. The non-receipt of manifests, primarily from off shore shipping activities, has always been a problem for RVN port operations. The authorization of an ADP Section to a Transportation Terminal Command would greatly enhance the overall efficiency of port operations.

FOR THE COMMANDERY



D. J. WINTER

1LT, AGC

Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
1st Logistical Command
4th Trans Comd

GPOP-DT (10 Feb 70) 4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 4th Transportation Command for
Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 27 APR 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310


This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

DD Cline

D.D. CLINE
2LT, AGC
Asst AG

4th TRANSPORTATION COMMAND (TTL C)



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4th Transportation Command

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